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Abstract 
The potential for spatial dependence in models of voter turnout, although plausible from a 
theoretical perspective, has not been adequately addressed in the literature. Using recent 
advances in Bayesian computation, we formulate and estimate the previously unutilized spatial 
Durbin error model and apply this model to the question of whether spillovers and unobserved 
spatial dependence in voter turnout matters from an empirical perspective. Formal Bayesian 
model comparison techniques are employed to compare the normal linear model, the spatially 
lagged X model (SLX), the spatial Durbin model, and the spatial Durbin error model. The 
results overwhelmingly support the spatial Durbin error model as the appropriate empirical 
model. 
JEL Codes: C11, C21 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Elections have proven to be fruitful areas of research for empirical economists studying 
public choice issues. It is interesting to observe that the amount of research devoted to 
uncovering the factors influencing how a person votes is dwarfed by the volume devoted to 
uncovering the factors influencing whether a person votes at all. The sizable amount of 
literature attempting to explain voter turnout is perhaps due to the fact that most studies do 
not yield consistent results (Tollison and Willett, 1973; Matsusaka, 1995; Matsusaka and 
Palda, 1999; Geys, 2006). Attempts have been made to capture the effects of formerly omitted 
variables in an effort to drive up the predictive power of models, but most have been 
underwhelming. 
This paper examines whether there is a spatial component to the as-yet unobserved 
influences on voter turnout. Factors that influence the costs and benefits of voting that are 
unobservable or difficult to measure may yet retain identifiable spatial effects. As a simple 
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example, good weather has been known to spur more turnout, yet quantifiable definitions of 
“good weather” may be hard to determine.2 Two inches of rain during commuting times may 
affect turnout differently than two inches at 5am or 10pm. However, while it is likely that good 
weather in county A will affect turnout positively, it is equally likely that this same good 
weather effect will spill over to adjacent county B. Though it is difficult to observe the effect of 
good weather itself, we can estimate the aggregate effect of all unobservable factors that have a 
geographic or spatial component. For a given geographic area, these may include a common set 
of values or political beliefs, local partisan competition, access to only a few sources of news 
media, a predominant employer or industry in the area, or other similar factors. Shachar and 
Nalebuff (1999), Feddersen (2004), and others describe the importance of groups motivated by 
a leader, and it certainly stands to reason that group membership and influence is highly 
spatially related. 
Similarly, political scientists and geographers have noted the importance of space for 
political issues, and have demonstrated the influence of local context and social interaction 
through spatial econometric techniques (e.g., O’Loughlin, et al., 1994) or more traditional non-
spatial estimation methods (Pattie and Johnston, 2000; Gerber, et al. 2008, which analyzes 
voter turnout). Key (1984) presents evidence (prior to its original publication in 1949) from 
Alabama on localism or the “friends and neighbors” effect, where candidates win significant 
support from their home counties even though statewide support is minimal. He attributes this 
to several factors, including the absence of strongly-established, well-organized political 
parties; lack of a traditional recruitment and advancement system for candidates; the relatively 
high importance that voters place on local versus state issues; and lack of party loyalty. Similar 
patterns were seen in Georgia, Florida, South Carolina, and other Southern states. The reasons 
for the strength of localism differed among the states, but its empirical observability has 
generated academic research explicitly accounting for spatial effects. 
Reliance on traditional non-spatial estimation techniques for data with known spatial effects 
is problematic. The presence of spatial error dependence can lead to biased standard errors 
much like other forms of autocorrelation. On the other hand, spatial dependence that is 
exhibited in the dependent variable (as a spatial lag) can lead to biased and inconsistent 
estimates of the parameters of interest. The benefit of utilizing spatial econometric techniques 
is that they can take into account these econometric issues that may unknowingly bias standard 
normal linear model results. 
 
II. MODEL AND DATA 
There are a few seminal economics articles in the voter turnout literature (Downs, 1957; 
Riker and Ordeshook, 1968; Barzel and Silberberg, 1973; Ashenfelter and Kelly, 1975; Filer and 
Kenney, 1980) whose theories motivate our models, but are generally well-known and need no 
review here. (A good review and meta-analysis of past studies is found in Geys, 2006). Voters 
make rational decisions on the costs and benefits of voting and behave accordingly. Typically, 
the benefits and costs are so small that slight disturbances in one or the other can tip turnout in 
unpredictable ways (see Aldrich, 1993). Despite this, there are characteristics of voters (or 
groups of voters) that most researchers generally agree will usually affect turnout. The job of 
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empirical economists has been to quantify these characteristics and measure their effects while 
trying to shore up the unpredictability of turnout through adding more control variables. 
Typically overlooked in the existing literature, though, is an explicit accounting for 
geographically-correlated factors that affect turnout.3 
Shachar and Nalebuff (1999) provides two important contributions to the study of voter 
turnout. First, it critiques the typical use of an ex post measure of election closeness as a control 
variable to describe the ex ante decision whether to vote. The potential value an individual vote 
has will depend on how close the election outcome is, since in a slim margin an individual vote 
has more weight. While most past research uses the actual outcome of the election as the 
measure of closeness, Shachar and Nalebuff recognize that this information is not available to 
voters heading to the polls.4 A second contribution, mentioned earlier, is the recognition of the 
influence that political leaders have when they expend effort to boost turnout. Their 
estimations include controls for US regions, but it is this concept of an influential political 
leader that will be more relevant for our discussion of spatial dependence in county voter 
turnout. 
The political science literature has considered the effect of geography on turnout and other 
forms of political participation. A recent paper by Cho and Rudolph (2008) seeks to uncover, via 
a spatial lag model, whether the observed spatial dependence in political participation is 
attributable to individual-level or macro-level characteristics (e.g. race, income), to diffusion 
through formal or informal social networks, or to subtle environmental cues taken through 
casual observation (e.g. yard signs, well-kept gardens, bumper stickers). After controlling for a 
typical set of individual, aggregate, and social network variables, the model’s spatial lag 
parameter is positive and significant, and a Lagrange Multiplier test for residual 
autocorrelation is insignificant. The authors maintain that this provides evidence that the 
spatial effect of participation is a result of casual observation. Concern remains, however, about 
their definition of their dependent variable. The data come from the Social Capital Benchmark 
Survey where respondents were asked if, in the last year, they 1) signed a petition, 2) attended a 
political meeting/rally, 3) worked on a community project,5 or 4) went to a protest/march/etc. 
The dependent variable was thus an additive index ranging from 0-4. Quantifying political 
participation in this way seems somewhat arbitrary; is a “2” respondent 100% more 
participatory than a “1” respondent? What if the “1” respondent attended 20 political meetings 
of different parties while the “2” respondent signed a single petition and worked on a single 
community project?  The construction of the dependent variable may call into question the 
results, although the premise is interesting.  
A second paper in political science that measures spatial dependence is Cutts and Webber 
(2010). In explaining political party vote shares, they find evidence that campaigning exhibits 
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including a dummy variable for turnout in the South. It is doubtful that a convincing spatial story can be told 
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spatial dependency; i.e. local campaign spending by a political party not only positively affects 
that party’s vote share in the constituency in which the spending is done, but also positively 
affects that party’s vote share in neighboring constituencies. They also estimate spatial error 
models. A possible flaw is the limited set of control variables (percent with higher educational 
degrees; percent of the population employed in manufacturing, agriculture, or education; 
percent who are pensioners, students, and Muslims; and the percent living in owner-occupied 
housing). There are also controls for campaign spending by the political parties, but other 
variables identified as important in the extant literature are not included in their analysis. One 
shortcoming of the study is that the authors do not calculate the proper marginal effects. The 
coefficients from a standard SAR model do not represent the true marginal effect of a change in 
an explanatory variable on the dependent variable. LeSage and Pace (2009) provide details 
regarding the calculation and interpretation of the direct, indirect, and total effects. 
Kim, et al. (2003) use a spatial lag model in a Bayesian framework to uncover spatial 
dependence in vote shares for the Democrats and Republicans in Presidential elections from 
1988 to 2000, as well as empirically testing whether voters decide current votes on past 
candidate behavior or on their expectation of the success of a particular party at fixing current 
economic problems. They construct two spatial weight matrices, first-order contiguity and a 
commuting matrix to capture the number of commuters from one county to another 
(“geographic” neighbors and “economic” neighbors). Their model of vote share is estimated 
using per capita income and the unemployment rate as controls. Even with this small set of 
explanatory variables (which, in some models, appear insignificant), they find significant spatial 
dependence. One shortcoming of this study is that the authors use maximum likelihood based 
Lagrange Multiplier test statistics to determine the most appropriate model and then 
subsequently use Bayesian techniques to estimate the model. In the Bayesian paradigm 
posterior model probabilities should be calculated for each model and then compared to 
determine the most appropriate model6. 
Darmofal (2006)7 says “citizens’ costs and benefits of voting and, by extension, their 
turnout, are recognized as depending not just on who citizens are [e.g., capturing their 
demographic or economic characteristics], but also on where they live.” (p.127). He examines 
county-level turnout for each presidential election from 1828 through 2000 and computes a 
global Moran’s I to detect spatial autocorrelation. After a series of diagnostic tests, Darmofal 
(2006) then estimates several spatial error models (SEM) to correct for the resulting spatial 
error dependence. Interestingly, Darmofal (2006, p. 145) finds "no clear evidence of contagion, 
or spatial lag dependence."  Another paper in the political science literature that indirectly 
addresses the geographic component of voter turnout is Nagel and McNulty (1996). The model 
is somewhat reversed from ours as they attempt to explain the vote share for Democrats as a 
function of turnout, but they examine elections from 1928 through 1994 and separate Southern 
and non-Southern states, and then look at elections in each state. Their primary aim is to assess 
the prevailing notion that turnout helps Democrats, so they are not addressing our topic 
directly but at least recognize geographic differences in turnout (albeit at a more aggregated 
level than our county-level data). They do not quantify, however, any spatial spillover effects. 
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Nickerson (2008) examines the spillover effect on turnout after one member of a two-person 
(two-voter) household has a direct face-to-face contact with a volunteer get-out-the-vote 
(GOTV) representative. In two cities, three groups of households were selected: one group was 
contacted with GOTV, a second with a message to recycle, and a third was not contacted at all. 
The spillover effect was determined by comparing the turnout rates of non-contacted persons 
(secondary message recipients). Directly-contacted GOTV voters were about ten percent more 
likely to vote, and indirect voters were six percent more likely to vote. 
Some issues with Nickerson’s results help to motivate our study. First, the estimated effect 
on secondary voters is not significant at 5% in a one-tailed test (though it is for direct voters) 
calling into question the spillover effect of voter turnout. Second, the effect on the secondary 
voter decays pretty quickly (and could be irrelevant if the effect was insignificant) and the 
implication is that the effect on tertiary voters (voting-age children, friends, coworkers) would 
be minimal, implying a spillover effect that would be quite small or negligible at the household 
(rather than individual voter) level, which again would indicate a lack of spatial autocorrelation 
at the county level in voter turnout. Third, the estimated spillover effect of the GOTV effort is 
determined by the percentage of the effect on the direct voter that induces the secondary voter 
to turn out. The author argues this effect is quite large (the direct voter passed on about 60% of 
the propensity to vote), but the individual effects on the direct and secondary voters was quite 
small (10% and 6%, respectively). It is not clear that a sizable spillover effect has been 
discovered when its impact is only a four-percentage point increase in turnout. 
The existing economics and political science literature provides the foundation for our 
estimated models. The decision to vote should be influenced by demographic, economic, and 
political factors that can be distinguished from those likely associated with nonvoters. To the 
extent that these individual factors are observable at the county level, hypotheses about county 
turnout can be made.8 The control variables we include are standard controls seen in the voter 
turnout literature. The contribution of this paper is in formulating and estimating several 
spatial econometric models designed to measure the extent to which factors influencing turnout 
at the county level are spatially correlated and to draw inferences from the model that best fits 
the data. As we will see in the model comparison exercise, the heretofore unused spatial Durbin 
error model "wins" our model comparison race9 and we draw inferences from this model.. 
We chose to analyze the 2004 Presidential election turnout at the county level, given that 
the popular “red/blue” county map appears to indicate significant spatial clustering. Red 
counties are likely to be surrounded by red counties and vice versa. This nonrandom grouping 
of red/blue counties indicates that there is possible spatial error correlation in that unobserved 
factors influencing turnout that vary over space need to be accounted for in a systematic 
manner.10 There may be local customs or historical reasons that certain areas of the country 
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vote in higher numbers that is ignored in the existing literature. This issue has normally been 
dealt with by using dummy variables for those regions but this approach does not properly 
model the interaction among the geographic entities. The spatial econometric techniques that 
we use better model these interactions. The sample includes 3,061 counties and excludes 
Alaska, Hawaii, Washington, D.C., and all cities in Virginia.11 
The dependent variables that we use represent the turnout of the county voting-age 
population (VAP) and the turnout of the citizen voting-age population (CVAP). Turnout is 
defined as the number of total votes cast for Bush and Kerry (from POLIDATA Demographic 
& Political Guides12) in the county divided by the relevant population. The voting-age 
population is the 2004 resident population estimate of those 18 and older from the Census 
Bureau’s Annual County Population Estimates,13 and the citizen voting-age population 
multiplies this by the Census’ Current Population Survey report of the percentage of the state 
18 and older population that is a citizen.14 
McDonald (2002) uses a similar voting-eligible population (VEP) measure, where he 
excludes not only non-citizens as we do but ineligible felons, as an alternative to the traditional 
VAP. Typically, felons include prisoners, parolees, and half of probationers, but state laws vary 
as to which of these groups are allowed to vote (e.g., in McDonald’s data, Virginia denied the 
vote to all of these groups, whereas Vermont denied it to none). McDonald calculated the 
number of “ineligible felons” in each state (according to the state laws existing at the time) to 
arrive at his VEP. 
For comparison purposes, we constructed a VEP turnout rate using 2004 data on parolees 
and probationers,15 and prisoners.16 The VEP is calculated similar to the CVAP where the 
county population was multiplied by the state citizen percentage, but the VEP further adjusts 
this for the state “ineligible felon” percentage.17 The ineligible felon population is relatively 
small; the means of the VAP, CVAP, and VEP turnout rates, respectively, are 58.1%, 61.6%, 
and 62.6%. We estimated models using the VEP, but the results (available upon request) were 
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16 U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract 2012, Table 347, which references Bureau of Justice Statistics Prisoners 
in 2009 and earlier report. 
17 Though our data is from 2004, we identified ineligible felons according to McDonald’s Table 1 which lists the 
voting eligibility of prisoners, parolees, and probationers by state. It is possible that state laws have changed 
between the time of McDonald’s article and 2004. 
not noticeably different from the VAP;18 further, our model comparison exercise still 
demonstrates preference of the VAP model over the VEP. 
Our use of two measures of turnout rather than one has support in the literature, especially 
as it applies to aggregate-level studies. Geys (2006) notes that of the 83 studies reviewed, about 
60% of them used turnout measures similar to ours. We also transformed the dependent 




Several papers argue that religious sentiment is associated with a stronger sense of civic duty,20 
and it was also popularly believed that religious voters played an important role in the 2004 
election, so we collected two variables measuring religiosity in counties. The religion variables 
come from the Glenmary Research Center of the Glenmary Home Missioners.21 The Research 
Center reports data from a study by the Association of Statisticians of American Religious 
Bodies, who surveyed 149 religious groups on different aspects of their membership counts. % 
religious adherents is the percentage of the total population in the county who are considered 
adherents of one of the religious groups. The churches variable is the number of churches per 
10,000 people in the total population in 2000. A higher percentage of adherents or number of 
churches at the county level is expected to positively affect turnout. 
White, black, and Hispanic indicate the percentage of a county’s population of the respective 
racial category. These data came from the Census 2000 Summary File (SF) 1 database. The 
typical belief in most studies of voter turnout associates white voters with higher turnout and 
black and Hispanic voters with lower turnout, so our hypotheses are similar.22 A different 
opinion is offered by Oberholzer-Gee and Waldfogel (2001), which examines the phenomenon 
of how black turnout is increased when the proportion of blacks in a jurisdiction rises. This 
finding, while throwing some doubt on the expectation of lower turnout for blacks generally, 
also supports the group theory of voting of Shachar and Nalebuff (1999) and others. 
Most articles include a measure of the age of the electorate,23 since older voters are 
expected to turn out in higher numbers than younger voters. Thus, we include the median age 
                                                 
18 For example, duplicating Table 5 (Total Effects) using the VEP yields ten significant variables compared to the 
eleven using the VAP. Four coefficients that were significant in the VAP (white, Hispanic, same house, and male 
with ba) become insignificant in the VEP, and three that were insignificant in the VAP (median age, rGDP 
growth, and the Texas dummy) become significant in the VEP. Three coefficients switch sign in the VEP model 
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positive and significant. The magnitudes of the coefficients change somewhat but for the significant variables the 
change is relatively minor. 
19 Specifically, we use the following transformation:y = log (y/(1-y)). 
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those who had recently moved in the past two years, demonstrating that church attendance is closely associated 
with social involvement. 
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22 Geys (2006) finds support for this hypothesis as well: two-thirds of the studies find lower turnout where 
minority share of the population is higher. 
23 See Merrifield (1993) for an example. 
of the resident population for each county from the Census Bureau’s Annual County Population 
Estimates, and expect it to be positively associated with turnout. 
A higher cost of voting should be associated with lower turnout, and some articles include a 
measure of the number of single-parent families.24 Such a family would presumably have less 
time available for voting, and so we include the percentage of family households that were 
single parent in each county from the 2000 Census.25 The percentage of single-family 
households is expected to be negatively associated with county turnout. 
We also hypothesize that voters with stronger ties to their communities will be more likely 
to vote in elections. Stigler (1975) suggests the importance of length of residence in a 
community, and Geys (2006) finds strong support among existing turnout studies of a positive 
relationship between “population stability” (including homeownership) and voter turnout. To 
proxy this, we calculated the percentage of the county population who resided in the same 
house between the years 1995 and 2000.26 The higher the proportion of long-term county 
residents, the higher we expect county turnout. 
We constructed two variables on likely voters in each county, the percentage male and the 
percentage female holding bachelor’s degrees, to test for a gender difference in turnout. These 
variables are defined as the percentage of a county’s total male 25-and-over population who 
hold a bachelor’s degree, and a similar definition for females. These data come from the 2000 
Census SF3 database. Lacombe and Shaughnessy (2007) found that women’s preferences for 
Kerry were stronger than men’s preferences for Bush though in some papers (e.g. Ashenfelter 
and Kelley, 1975) men have a higher turnout; we therefore expect a difference in turnout 
between the sexes with perhaps a slight edge toward males. 
Also included in our regression model is the percentage of the county population living in 
urban areas, obtained from the 2000 Census SF1 database. Hackey (1992) finds a positive 
association between turnout of black voters in the 1976, 1980, and 1984 presidential elections 
and whether the voter lived in an urban area, but one might posit that voters living in higher 
density areas perceive more competition, and thus a lower weight attached to their vote, than 
do rural voters. This negative relationship between urbanization and turnout is weakly 
supported in Geys (2006) meta-analysis of previous voter turnout studies, where urbanization 
and turnout are usually negatively but insignificantly related. 
 
Economic variables 
A persistent finding in the literature on turnout is that economic conditions of voters 
influence turnout. First, higher income voters tend to vote more often than lower income 
voters,27 so we include a measure of the natural log of per capita personal income in 2004 for 
the county. The data come from the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ Regional Economic 
Accounts. 
                                                 
24 Wittman (1975) suggests the importance of this variable in influencing voting costs. 
25 Summary File 1, Table P19. (Male householder, no wife present + Female householder, no husband present) / 
Family households. 
26 Census 2000 Summary File 3, Table P24. 
27 Wittman (1975) hypothesizes that this does not have to be true; higher income people may vote less and lower 
may vote more, though the existing evidence does not support his point.  
A second economic variable is the county’s 2004 unemployment rate. These data come from 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics Local Area Unemployment database. Given that Bush was the 
incumbent in 2004 and that voters typically credit or blame the president for business 
conditions, a bad job market will likely lead voters to voice their displeasure.28 Thus, we expect 
that a higher county unemployment rate is associated with higher turnout. 
Similar to unemployment, voters would be more inclined to be satisfied with the incumbent 
if output growth was good. Shachar and Nalebuff (1999) include a measure of GNP growth that 
is positively associated with turnout and significant. We thus include the growth rate of real 
state GDP, and expect that a higher GDP growth rate is associated with higher turnout. 
Given the prominence that labor unions place on political efforts and voter turnout drives,29 
the amount of unionization is expected to influence turnout as well. We collected 2004 data 
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey 
on union affiliation of employed wage and salary workers by state.30 Higher unionization is 
expected to be positively associated with turnout. 
 
Political variables 
An important issue in the 2004 election was controversy over Bush’s handling of the War 
in Iraq. A proxy that we use to express strong sentiment about the Iraq War is the percentage 
of the civilian population age 18 and over who are civilian veterans. These data come from 
Census 2000 information via the Department of Veteran Affairs, which collected data on the 
veteran population in the United States and Puerto Rico sorted by county and by period of 
service.31 Veterans on average would have strong opinions about the continuation of the Iraq 
War, and thus we hypothesize that a higher veteran percentage in the county is associated with 
higher county turnout. 
Another important political issue in the 2004 election was the presence of constitutional 
amendments to define marriage as “one man-one woman” on state ballots; voters (particularly 
religious voters) were believed to have turned out at much higher rates to voice their opinion. 
We use a dummy variable that equals one if, in the 2004 election, the state in which that county 
resides had a popular vote on a state constitutional amendment to ban gay marriage. The data 
came from CNN’s 2004 Election website on state ballot measures.32 Even though popular 
opinion was that the presence of a gay marriage amendment would boost turnout, Lacombe and 
Shaughnessy (2007) found that the presence of these amendments did not significantly affect 
the percentage of Bush votes, so we expect at best a weak positive association between these 
amendments and turnout. 
An important hypothesis in the voter turnout literature is that the value of a vote drives 
turnout; if voters perceive that their vote contributes more to the outcome of the election, then 
they will vote in higher numbers. The typical way this is measured is by including a variable on 
population, but since we already utilized population in constructing our turnout rate variable 
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29 See Delaney, Masters, and Schwochau (1988) and Zullo (2004). 
30 Table 5, http://www.bls.gov/webapps/legacy/cpslutab5.htm 
31 http://www1.va.gov/vetdata/page.cfm?pg=1 
32 http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/pages/results/ballot.measures/ 
we rejected that approach.33 We proxied “vote value” in two ways. First, it is reasonable to 
assume that voters assign a weight to their Presidential vote in proportion to the number of 
electoral votes assigned to their state since electoral votes will mirror population; thus, to 
measure the county’s share of the state’s electoral vote we multiplied the number of state 
electoral votes34 by the percentage of the state population that resides in the particular county. 
We expect a negative association between this county electoral vote share and county turnout. 
“Vote value” is also likely affected by the growth rate of the surrounding population. Faster 
growth of the population of competing voters will more quickly dilute the importance of a 
particular vote.35 To measure this, we collected data on the county age 18 and over population 
in 2003 and 2004 from the Census’ Annual Estimates of County Population and calculated the 
growth rate between them.36 As the voting-age population grows in the county, we expect that 
county turnout should fall. 
A debate in the turnout literature exists over how to control for the perceived closeness of 
the election. Obviously, the closer the election is perceived to be the greater value an individual 
will place on his vote, and thus the higher the expected turnout. Many times the measure for 
expected closeness is the actual election outcome itself,37 but as detailed in Shachar and 
Nalebuff (1999) and Geys (2006) this raises the problem of trying to measure an ex ante 
expectation with an ex post outcome. In support of ex ante measures, Geys’ (2006) meta-analysis 
finds that ex ante measures of closeness have a 74% “success rate” (achieving an expected result) 
versus a 51% “success rate” for ex post measures. One proxy is to include pre-election opinion 
polls or professional analysis or opinion. Carter (1984) tests both ex post and ex ante measures, 
where the ex ante are measured by Time and Newsweek magazines considering the state to favor 
one candidate strongly, to simply favor one candidate, or to be too close to call. The ex post 
measures of actual closeness (percent of vote going to winning candidate) were unexpectedly 
positively associated with turnout, while the ex ante results showed that stronger leaning for a 
candidate reduced turnout as expected. We adopt the same approach here, and use the October 
29, 2004 Cook Electoral Rating from the Cook Political Report.38 A state that was “solid” for 
Bush or Kerry was coded as 0; “likely” Bush or Kerry was coded as 1; “leans” Bush or Kerry as 
2; and a “toss up” as 3. Given our coding, we expect a positive association between the Cook 
variable and county turnout. 
We also include in our estimating equations dummy variables for counties that reside in the 
states of Texas and Massachusetts to capture any “home state” effects. We expect that voters in 
the candidates’ home states will be more likely than others to turn out, ceteris paribus, since they 
                                                 
33 Geys (2006) meta-analysis finds only a third of the studies test for the effect of population on turnout, but of 
those, 56% find the expected negative relationship between population size and turnout. Quantitatively, a one-
standard deviation change in population reduces turnout by 0.48 to 0.65 standard deviations, so that Geys 
concludes “Population size has a statistically significant negative effect on turnout.” 
34 From the Federal Elections Commission: http://www.fec.gov/pages/elecvote.htm 
35 Merrifield (1993) includes a measure of population growth and finds it is highly significant and negatively 
related to turnout. 
36 http://www.census.gov/popest/counties/asrh/CC-EST2005-agesex.html 
37 For example, Matsusaka (1993). Geys (2006) finds strong support for this position (one standard deviation 
increase in closeness leads to a statistically significant 0.58-0.69 standard deviation increase in turnout), but also 
points out that several studies take an indirect approach, since close elections drive more voter mobilization efforts 
by political parties, which thus drives higher turnout. 
38 As reported on CNN’s 2004 Election page: 
http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/special/president/showdown/cook.html 
presumably have more, and more reliable, information about the home candidate than “foreign” 
states. Descriptive statistics of the data used and their sources are in Table 1. 
 
III. Econometric Models 
While we included what we consider a relatively rich set of controls, it is possible that there 
are unobservable factors such as political sentiment, sense of civic duty, or group identities that 
influence voter turnout that retain a strong geographical or spatial component. A strong sense 
of civic pride and duty to vote that prevails in one county likely will affect turnout in 
neighboring counties. Thus, these omitted unobservable factors that vary systematically over 
geographic space may result in residual spatial autocorrelation. There is also the possibility 
that our dependent variable could exhibit spatial autocorrelation if we believe that voter 
turnout in one county affects voter turnout in neighboring counties. In either case, the 
inferences drawn from standard econometric techniques (such as the normal linear model) may 
be misleading. 
In order to overcome these deficiencies, we estimate voter turnout using four separate 
models: the normal linear model, the spatially lagged X model (SLX), the spatial Durbin model, 
and the spatial Durbin error model. We then employ Bayesian model comparison techniques to 
choose the most appropriate model. 
The first model that we estimate, and the most common one found in the literature, is the 
normal linear model. The estimating equation for this model is as follows: 
( )20,
V A P D D E E P P
CV A P D D E E P P
n
y X X X
y X X X
MV N I
a b b b e
a b b b e
e s
= + + + +
= + + + +
:
 
where V APy  is the (logit transformed) proportion of the voting-age population who turned out 
to vote; CV A Py  is the (logit transformed) proportion of the citizen voting age population who 
turned out to vote; DX  is the vector of demographic variables (% religious adherents, churches, 
% white, % black, % Hispanic, median age, % single-parent, % in same house, % male with 
bachelor’s, % female with bachelor’s, and % urban population); EX  is the vector of economic 
variables (log of per capita income, unemployment rate, real GDP growth from 2003-04, and 
state union member rate ); PX is the vector of political variables (% veterans, gay marriage 
amendment dummy, county share of state electoral votes, population growth of 18 and older 
from 2003-04, Cook closeness rating, and Texas and Massachusetts dummies); Db , Eb , and Pb  
are the vectors of coefficients to be estimated, and e  is an i.i.d. normal error term. 
Our first spatially explicit model, the spatially lagged X (SLX) model is identical to the 
normal linear model specification above with the exception that spatially weighted independent 
variables are added to the specification. The spatially weighted independent variables take the 
general form of W X´ , where W  is an N N´ row-standardized contiguity spatial weight 
matrix and X  is an independent variable. The newly formed WX variables represent a 
weighted average of surrounding values of the independent variables and are designed to pick 
up any influence of surrounding values of the independent variables in question on the 
dependent variable. It may be that independent factors outside of a voter’s home county may 
influence their decision to go to the polls and vote. For example, if the unemployment rate in an 
adjoining county is high, voters may perceive that the economy is worse off than if they just 
observed their own county’s unemployment rate. A spatially lagged independent variable is 
designed to pick up such factors in a voter’s decision making process.  
The spatially lagged X (SLX) estimating equations take the following form: 
( )20,
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where Dq , Eq  and Pq  represent the coefficients on the spatially weighted demographic, 
economic, and political variables, respectively.  
The third model that we estimate and test is the spatial Durbin model. The spatial Durbin 
model allows for spatial spillovers in the dependent variable (through a spatially lagged 
dependent variable) as well as through spatially lagged independent variables. LeSage and Pace 
(2009) note that the spatial Durbin model is appropriate if two separate conditions hold. First, 
there must be omitted variables from the model that are spatially correlated. Second, these 
spatially correlated omitted variables must be correlated with an included explanatory variable 
in the model. In our particular case, it may be that a variable that measures some membership 
in a civic group is omitted from our model and that this variable is spatially correlated, simply 
because memberships in these groups tend to be geographically based. Additionally, this 
spatially correlated omitted variable that measures group membership could be correlated with 
another included explanatory variable, such as per-capita income. If our model were to exhibit 
such characteristics, then the spatial Durbin model would be most appropriate. 
The spatial Durbin model takes the following form: 
( )20,
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where r  is the spatial autocorrelation parameter, W  is an N N´  spatial weight matrix, and 
Dq , Eq  and Pq  represent the coefficients on the spatially weighted demographic, economic, and 
political variables, respectively and the b 's represent the coefficients on the non-spatially 
weighted explanatory variables. 
 As mentioned before, although we have included a number of independent variables that 
are believed to influence voter behavior, there is the possibility that there are unobserved 
factors that may vary systematically over space, resulting in residual spatial error correlation. 
Since neither the normal linear model nor the spatially lagged X (SLX) model formally take 
this residual spatial correlation into account, we estimate what LeSage and Pace (2009, pp. 41-
42) refer to as the spatial Durbin error model. The spatial Durbin error model combines the 
spatially lagged X (SLX) model with an error process that accounts for residual spatial 
autocorrelation: 
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where the dependent and independent variables are as before, W  is an N N´  row-stochastic 
spatial weight matrix, l is the spatial autocorrelation coefficient, and e  is an i.i.d. error term. 
The spatial Durbin error model is an augmented spatially lagged X (SLX) model that allows 
for a spatially autocorrelated error structure. We note that this model does not contain a 
spatially lagged dependent variable, which is consistent with Nickerson’s (2008) observations 
regarding spillover effects in voter turnout at the household level, i.e. that spillovers are most 
likely highly localized and are probably non-existent at the county level.  
 Even though there may be theoretical or empirical reason to doubt the validity of 
including a spatially lagged dependent variable in our specification, we estimate and test the 
spatial Durbin model as part of the modeling exercise. Given that we have four possible models 
that can describe the data generating environment, we now turn to the statistical model and a 
description of the Bayesian techniques that are utilized to make inferences. 
 
 
IV. Statistical Model 
By way of notation, let q  denote a vector of parameters of interest, ( )p q  the prior probability 
density function (pdf) for q , and let ( )f y q  represent the likelihood function. The posterior 
distribution of the parameters, namely ( )yp q , is derived via Bayes’ Rule 








where ( )yp  is the integrating constant that ensures that the posterior probability density 
integrates to unity.39 Given that ( )yp  does not involve the parameter vector q , we can ignore 
this constant in subsequent analyses and write Bayes’ Theorem in a familiar form 
( ) ( ) ( )y yp q p q p qµ ´  
thus resulting in the familiar Bayesian phrase, “the posterior is proportional to the likelihood 
times the prior.” Ideally, we would like to draw inferences regarding the parameters of the 
model by analytically integrating the joint posterior distribution for each of the model’s 
parameters, resulting in a marginal distribution for each parameter.  However, the analytical 
solution to this integration problem is available only in a few select cases. In deriving the 
marginal distributions these complications force us to draw inferences using iterative 
procedures referred to, generically, as Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods (MCMC). 
Specifically, we will make use of the Gibbs sampler and the Metropolis-Hasting algorithm to 
provide robust inferences regarding the model parameters.  
 The Gibbs sampler is an algorithm to generate a sequence of samples from the joint 
posterior distribution of the parameters when an analytical solution is unavailable. Gibbs 
sampling is applicable when the joint posterior is intractable, but the full conditional 
distributions of each parameter is known. In the case of the normal linear model as well as the 
spatially lagged X (SLX) model, the full conditional distributions follow standard forms for the 
b  and 2s  terms, namely the multivariate normal distribution for b  and an inverted Gamma 
distribution for the 2s  term40. In the case of the spatial Durbin model and spatial Durbin error 
model, the full conditional distributions for the b  and 2s  terms retain the same distributional 
form as in the normal linear model case41, however, there is the added complication regarding 
the full conditional distribution for the l  term (or r  term in the spatial Durbin model). The 
full conditional distribution for the l  (or r ) term does not fall into any recognizable 
distributional form, and therefore the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm must be used to draw 
inferences regarding this parameter. Details regarding MCMC estimation of spatial 
econometric models is covered in LeSage and Pace (2009, Chapter 5) and Lacombe (2008).  
                                                 
39 The pi(y) quantity is also referred to as the marginal likelihood and plays a vital role in model comparison 
exercises. 
40 Details regarding the Gibbs sampler as applied to the normal linear model can be found in Koop (2003, Chapter 
4). 
41 The full conditional distributions for the b  and 2s  terms will take the same form, however, the arguments in 
each of the distributions will differ from the normal linear and spatially lagged X (SLX) models. 
 The formula for Bayes’ Rule explicitly allows for prior information to be included in the 
statistical analysis. In each of our models, we use proper prior distributions, but with relatively 
non-informative values. Specifically, we set the prior for the b ’s to come from a multivariate 
normal distribution with mean ˆ 0Kb º  and covariance ˆ 10, 000 KC Ib º ´ . The prior values for 
the 2s  parameter, which comes from the inverted Gamma distribution, are 0 1v º  and 
2
0 1s º  




º , which is distributed univariate normal. These same values for the prior mean 
and prior covariance are used for the l  parameter in the spatial Durbin error model. 
 Another appealing aspect of Bayesian analysis is the formal statistical derivation of 
model comparison techniques. The essential inputs in Bayesian model comparisons are the 
marginal likelihoods of competing models. The marginal likelihood, denoted ( )yp , is the 
integrating constant that ensures that the posterior distribution integrates to unity. Until 
recently, the computation of the marginal likelihood has proved to be extremely burdensome 
for all but the simplest models. The innovation that paves the way for general application is an 
algorithm developed by Chib (1995). The marginal likelihood 
( ) ( ) ( )y f y dp q p q q= ò  
can alternatively be written as the product of the sampling density as the prior for q  divided by 
the posterior for q  








The above quantity is what Chib (1995) refers to as the basic marginal likelihood identity and 
robust estimates of ( )yp  are available. Once converted to the computationally convenient log 
scale, an estimate of the log marginal likelihood ( )ln yp is available as 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* * *ln ln ln lny f y yp q p q p q= + -  
where ( )*f y q , ( )*p q  and ( )* yp q  denote estimate of the sampling density, the prior ordinate, 
and the posterior ordinate, respectively at the point *q q= . In the case that one of the full 
conditional distributions is derived via a Metropolis-Hastings step, the basic algorithm of Chib 
(1995) can be amended to include the parameter of interest in the calculation of the log 
marginal likelihood (Chib and Jeliazkov, 2001) .42 
 
V. Results 
 We begin our discussion of the results by noting that across all four model 
specifications (i.e. the normal linear model, the spatially lagged X (SLX) model, the spatial 
Durbin model, and the spatial Durbin error model) the model exhibiting the largest value of the 
log-marginal likelihood was associated with the dependent variable that measured county 
turnout as a proportion of the county voting age population. 43 
 Table 2 contains the result of our model choice exercise. Looking at the second column, 
we see that the model with the highest value of the log-marginal likelihood is the spatial 
Durbin error model. Alternatively, we may calculate posterior model probabilities according to 
the following formula: 
( ) ( ) ( )
















where ( )iM yp is the posterior probability of model i , ( )iMp is the prior probability of model 
i , and ( )iy Mp is the marginal likelihood for model i , where { }1, , JM MK denotes each of the 
J  models. We place equal prior probability on each of the three models in question, so that 
( )iMp  is equal to 1 4 . The second column of Table 2 contains the results of our calculation 
and indicates that the spatial Durbin error model is almost certainly the preferred model, with a 
posterior model probability 1» . Given the overwhelming evidence that the most preferred 
model is the spatial Durbin error model, we restrict our interpretation of the results to this 
particular model. However, we must first make a few notes regarding the interpretation of such 
models. 
 Spatial econometric models that contain a spatially lagged y  variable (i.e. W yr ) need to 
be interpreted with care in that the coefficients from these models need to be transformed 
before interpretation can take place. LeSage and Pace (2009, Chapter 2) develop a method that 
allows one to calculate the direct, indirect, and total effects estimates that allows one to 
properly interpret the regression results. The direct effect is the effect of a change in an 
                                                 
42 Both methods allow for the calculation of a numerical standard error for the marginal likelihood. See Chib 
(1995) for details. 
43  The log-marginal likelihood calculation also indicates the VAP model is preferred to the VEP (McDonald, 
2002). 
explanatory variable at location i  on the dependent variable at location i  (plus feedback 
effects), the indirect effect is how a change in an explanatory variable at location j i¹  affects 
the dependent variable at location i , and the total effect is the sum of the two effects estimates.  
 Spatial regression models such as the spatial error model (SEM) that do not involve 
spatial lags of the dependent variable produce coefficient estimates that are interpreted in the 
standard fashion, i.e. effect of a change in an explanatory variable (regardless of location) on the 
dependent variable is simply equal to the coefficient of the explanatory variable. However, 
standard SEM models do not allow for indirect impacts to arise from changes in explanatory 
variables, i.e. a change in an explanatory variable at location j  cannot affect the dependent 
variable at location i , which could be considered a shortcoming of the standard SEM model. 
 The spatial Durbin error model that we use to draw inferences, as explained by LeSage 
and Pace (2009, p. 42), does allow for spatially lagged independent variables, in the form of our 
W X variables. In terms of the direct, indirect, and total effects estimates, these are easily 
derived from the underlying econometric model. The direct effects correspond to the model 
parameters b , the indirect effects correspond to the model parameters q , and the total effects 
are the sum of the two.44 We perform inference by calculating Bayesian 95% credible intervals 
using the set of 10,000 retained draws from the MCMC estimation routine. Credible intervals 
that do not contain the value zero point to a marginal posterior distribution for the parameter 
that is far enough away from zero that it gives credence to an important role played by that 
particular explanatory variable in explaining voter turnout at the county level.  
 In sum, our spatial Durbin error model allows for a richer interpretation compared to a 
standard spatial error model (SEM) and has the advantage that calculation of the direct, 
indirect, and total effects estimates is straightforward.  
 Table 3 contains information regarding the direct effects in our spatial Durbin error 
model. Recall that the direct effect is the effect of a change in an explanatory variable at 
location i  on the dependent variable at location i . We can think of the direct effects as the 
"own effects" of a change in an explanatory variable. Entries in bold represent independent 
variables that are associated with explaining variation in the dependent variable, i.e. that do not 
contain zero within their credible intervals. 
 For our demographic variables, we find that the signs of the coefficient estimates are in 
accordance with our a priori expectations for those variables associated with turnout. Religious 
sentiment may have played a role in the 2004 Presidential turnout as Bush self-identified as a 
Christian, and to capture the possible relationship we utilized two different measures of county 
religiosity. The results indicate that the number of churches per 10,000 population is positively 
associated with voter turnout at the county level, while the number of religious adherents is 
not. The adherents variable captures anyone who self-identifies with one of over 149 religious 
                                                 
44 Gelfand et al. (1990) show that one can perform valid inference regarding non-linear parameter relationships 
using non-linear combinations of the MCMC draws. 
groups, which obviously includes some non-Christian denominations or others who might be 
wary of voting for someone who self-identifies at Christian. The churches variable is more 
likely to capture voter sentiment regarding religious preferences and this may be why we 
obtain these results. 
As expected, our results indicate that white voters are more likely to have higher 
turnout at the county level and that Hispanic voters are less likely to turn out to vote at the 
county level, while the black variable is not associated with explaining variation in the 
dependent variable. As mentioned earlier, Geys (2006) shows mixed evidence on black voting 
as well: aggregate-level studies indicate lower turnout in areas with a higher proportion of 
blacks, but this may be due to the fact that as the black population increases, black turnout 
actually rises while white turnout (and thus overall turnout in the population) falls. 
 In terms of the aggregate level of education and how this affects voter turnout at the 
county level, we note that variables measuring educational attainment at the county level for 
both males and females have positive coefficient estimates. The point estimate for males is 
slightly higher than the estimate for females, but the credible interval for the difference 
between the male and female bachelor's degree holder variables contains zero, so that we 
cannot say that these coefficients are statistically different from each other.45 
 Of the remaining demographic variables, we note that the median age of residents, 
single-parent family, same house, and the urban variables are all associated with explaining 
variation in the dependent variable and all have the expected coefficient sign. Counties with 
older populations are more likely to turn out to vote, counties with more single-parent families 
have lower turnout, counties where the population has lived in the same house for five years are 
also more likely to turn out to vote, and the population as a whole in urban counties is less 
likely to turn out to vote. 
 Our economic variables are designed to capture any sentiment at the county level 
related to economic events, either good or bad. Of the four economic variables included in the 
estimating equation, the per-capita income at the county level and the real GDP growth rate 
from 2003 to 2004 are associated with explaining variation in the dependent variable. The 
unemployment rate at the county level and the state union membership, though they have the 
expected signs, do not appear to have any effect on voter turnout at the county level. These 
results seem to indicate that overall economic conditions are relevant for turnout at the county 
level whereas unemployment and union membership appear to play no role. 
 Our final category of independent variables, the political variables, has some surprising 
results. Of the variables that are included in the regression model, only the veterans, electoral 
votes, and the Cook political rating variables are associated with explaining variation in the 
                                                 
45 In order to test if the point estimate for the male with a bachelor's degree variable was different from the point 
estimate for the female with a bachelor's degree variable, we took the Gibbs draws for each of these variables, 
subtracted them, and calculated a 95% credible interval, which equaled [-0.0842,1.7187]. Since the credible 
interval contains the value zero, we cannot say that there is any difference between the point estimates.  
dependent variable. However, each of these variables has a sign that is consistent with our a 
priori expectations. The veterans variable has a positive coefficient estimate, indicating that as 
the percentage of veterans in a county increases, voter turnout in the county increases. 
Considering that each of the two candidates running in this particular election had some 
military experience, this result makes intuitive sense since veterans are more likely to turn out 
to vote if the candidates share a common characteristic with the voter. The electoral vote share 
variable, which is designed to capture "vote value," has a negative coefficient indicating that if 
the aggregate value of the vote is diluted, then it can suppress voter turnout. Finally, the Cook 
political rating, which measures how close the election is, has a positive coefficient estimate, 
which shows that as the race becomes more of a "toss up" between the candidates, county 
turnout is higher. Interestingly, we find no evidence that the various gay marriage ballot 
initiatives had an effect on voter turnout at the county level. Also, there appears to be no "home 
state" advantage for either candidate as the Texas and Massachusetts state dummy variables 
were not associated with explaining variation in the dependent variable. Overall, these results 
accord with our ex ante expectations. 
 Table 4 contains the results for the indirect effects for the spatial Durbin error model. 
The indirect effects measure how a change in an explanatory variable at location j i¹  affects 
the dependent variable at location i . These spatially weighted X  variables are designed to 
capture any spillover effects from our set of explanatory variables. Out of our full set of 22 
explanatory variables, only six of them have 95% credible intervals that do not span zero: 
religious adherents, Hispanic population, median age of the county population, female 
bachelor's degree holders, the urban population, and veterans.  
 The percentage of county population who are religious adherents has a positive 
coefficient estimate, indicating that as the population that self-identifies as a religious adherent 
in surrounding counties increases, an increase in voter turnout is seen in the home county. 
Interestingly, the direct effect for churches was a factor that affected voter turnout while the 
direct effect for adherents did not. We have the exact opposite result in terms of the indirect 
effects: the adherents variable is a factor that affects voter turnout while churches is not. This 
may reflect the fact that although churches are located in a single county, the county level 
percentage of the population that self-identify as religious adherents are not necessarily 
confined to a single county. People are mobile and may actually travel to another county to 
attend services, broadly defined. If they then associate with other like-minded congregants who 
live in neighboring counties, the county spillover effect on turnout may be more pronounced. 
 The percentage of the county population that is Hispanic has a positive spillover effect 
on county level voter turnout. Recall that the direct effect of this variable was negative, 
indicating a negative relationship between county level population of this demographic group 
and voter turnout, which was expected. Our indirect results indicate that as the Hispanic 
county level population increases in surrounding counties, the percentage of the own county 
population that turns out to vote decreases. At first, this observation may seem contradictory 
but may simply reflect demographic changes at the county level. If surrounding counties’ 
Hispanic populations are increasing, then it may be the case that the own county's population is 
becoming less Hispanic and this demographic change may increase voter turnout if other 
demographic groups are "replacing" the Hispanic population in the own county. 
 Of the two variables related to education, only the percentage of the county population 
who are female with a bachelor's degree variable is associated with explaining variation in the 
dependent variable. If the county population who are female with a bachelor's degree variable in 
surrounding counties increases, then the own county's voter turnout increases. One possible 
explanation for this result is that better educated females may be more politically active and 
that this activity spills over across county borders, due to media exposure or other publicity 
(akin to Cho and Rudolph’s (2008) “casual observation” hypothesis) and this publicity may 
inspire or otherwise motivate individuals to head to the polls. 
The positive coefficient estimate for veterans indicates that as the population of veterans in 
surrounding counties increases, we see an increase in county level voter turnout in the own 
county. One possible explanation for this result is that veterans may be more politically active 
than other demographic groups and that this political activity may be more readily noticed in 
surrounding counties and hence may boost turnout. Veterans, relative to other identifiable 
characteristics, may be more likely to know of and associate with other nearby veterans so the 
county spillover effect on turnout is more pronounced, similar to the religious adherents 
variable above. 
 Our last two indirect effects, the percentage of the county population living in urban 
areas and the median age of the resident county population, both have negative spillover effects. 
The spillover effect for the urban variable reinforces the direct effect due to the same sign 
however the median age variable has a negative indirect effect, which dilutes the direct effect 
somewhat. 
 The final set of results for the total effects is contained in Table 5. The total effects 
measure the sum of both the direct effects and the indirect effects.46 The total effects measure 
how a change in an explanatory variable affects voter turnout inclusive of the own county and 
surrounding county spillover effects. The results for the total effects estimates can be broken 
down by examining the different groups of variables that we use in our analysis in a manner 
similar to our previous results. The total effects estimates as a whole have signs on the 
coefficient estimates that are in accordance with our a priori expectations for those variables 
that have credible intervals that do not contain zero.  
 Of the two variables that measure religious sentiment, only the percentage of the county 
population that are self-identified religious adherents matters in terms of county turnout. This 
result seems to reinforce the idea that religious sentiment is more important in explaining 
turnout than the actual number of churches per 10,000 county residents. Adherents to one of 
                                                 
46 The total effects were calculated by summing the Gibbs draws for each explanatory variable for their respective 
b  and q  coefficient draws and then a 95% credible interval was calculated for each variable. 
many religious groups as defined in the Glenmary survey may have a more intense interest in 
public affairs or have a more nuanced sense of civic duty than non-religious types and hence 
appear to have higher turnout, all else equal. 
 As was the case for the direct estimates, the white and Hispanic variables are associated 
with explaining variation in the dependent variable, while the variable that measures the 
county population that is black does not. Additionally, the signs are in accordance with our ex 
ante expectations, i.e. an increase in the white population increases voter turnout while an 
increase in the Hispanic population decreases turnout. 
 The total effects also indicate that when the percentage of the county population that 
has a bachelor's degree increases (regardless of gender), there is an increase in voter turnout. It 
appears that education plays a major role in explaining voter turnout at the county level. 
 Of the remaining demographic variables, the county urban population and the 
percentage of the county population living in the same house are associated with voter turnout, 
but in opposite directions. The urban population has a negative coefficient estimate which may 
indicate that counties with large urban areas experience a dilution in the weight attached to 
their vote. Even though the value of an individual vote is quite low, non-urban voters on 
election day may not have many social or recreational activities in which to participate, so the 
opportunity cost of voting is quite low. Urban voters, however, consider the opportunity cost of 
voting as quite high in terms of forgone opportunities for entertainment, shopping, dining out, 
etc., relative to their vote value. This result is in contrast to the result found by Geys (2006) 
which established that urbanization and voter turnout were weakly associated. 
 We turn our attention now to the economic variables, and the total effects results 
indicate that the only economic variable that is associated with the dependent variable is the 
state unionization variable, which has a positive coefficient estimate. The per-capita income, 
unemployment, and real GDP growth rate appear to have no effect on voter turnout at the 
county level in our model. Given the prominence that labor unions place on political efforts and 
voter turnout drives,47 this result should not be too surprising. However, it is surprising that 
none of the other economic variables in terms of total effects are associated with explaining 
voter turnout at the county level. 
 Our final group of variables that we examine are the political variables. Of the seven 
political variables that we utilize in our model specification, only the veterans, electoral votes in 
a county, and Cook closeness rating are associated with our dependent variable.  
 The percentage of the county population that are veterans has a positive association 
with voter turnout. In the 2004 election, a group known at the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth 
ran several television advertisements that were highly critical of the candidacy of John Kerry, 
who made his military service a major part of his election campaign. Regardless of the veracity 
                                                 
47 See Delaney, Masters, and Schwochau (1988) and Zullo (2004). 
of the claims made by the group, this kind of grass-roots organizing may indicate the power 
that veterans groups (broadly defined) have in terms of stimulating voter turnout, much like 
the influence that labor unions have in organizing voter turnout. 
 As we mentioned in the section explaining our choice of political variables, we proxied 
“vote value” in two ways, one of which was that voters assign a weight to their Presidential 
vote in proportion to the number of electoral votes assigned to their state since electoral votes 
will mirror population. Our results indicate that our a priori expectation of a negative 
relationship between this county electoral vote share and county turnout is confirmed. 
 Finally, we attempted to proxy for the closeness of the election using the Cook Electoral 
Rating from the Cook Political Report. Recall that a state that was “solid” for Bush or Kerry 
was coded as 0; “likely” Bush or Kerry was coded as 1; “leans” Bush or Kerry as 2; and a “toss 
up” as 3. Given our coding, we expected a positive association between this explanatory 
variable and county voter turnout. The coefficient estimate for this variable indicates that there 
is indeed a positive relationship between the Cook report rating and voter turnout at the 
county level. It appears that states that were deemed "toss up" states had higher turnout at the 




The amount of literature on voter turnout is extensive mostly because the presumed 
benefits and costs of voting are so small that slight disturbances can alter turnout in seemingly 
unpredictable ways. This paper adds to the existing literature by comparing four different 
possible models of voter turnout at the county level: the normal linear model, the spatially 
lagged X (SLX) model, the spatial Durbin model, and the heretofore unused spatial Durbin 
error model. Using modern Bayesian econometric estimation and model comparison 
techniques, our results overwhelmingly provide support for the spatial Durbin error model, 
which provides inferences regarding direct, indirect, and total effects of the set of explanatory 
variables on the dependent variable. Quantifying these various effects may be important for 
policy reason as well. For example, the direct effects show how a change in an explanatory 
variable in one county affects voter turnout in that same county, which may be of interest to 
certain stakeholders, such as voter turnout advocates. However, our preferred model also 
shows that there may be indirect effects also associated with changes in explanatory variables 
that affect voter turnout. For example, the percentage of the county population who are 
veterans had a positive direct effect which shows that as the county level veteran population 
increases, we see an increase in voter turnout in neighboring counties. This result indicates 
that there may be additional benefits to voter turnout drives that extend beyond a county's 
border. 
The results from the spatial Durbin error model also shows that many independent 
variables commonly thought to influence voter turnout actually are not associated with voter 
turnout at the county level at all, including some rather surprising ones such as per-capita 
income and the county unemployment rate. Additionally, some commonly-held opinions such 
as the effect of a gay marriage ballot initiative to spur voter turnout prove not to have any 
empirical support. 
 Spatial econometric techniques are seeing increasing use in various fields such as 
political science and economics, to name but two. These models in general, and the spatial 
Durbin error model we use in this paper in particular, can provide much more detailed 
empirical findings for researchers who are interested in quantifying spillover effects and how 
these effects can guide policy for various stakeholders. 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 Mean Stan. Dev. Source 
Turnout, Voting-Age Pop. 0.5804 0.0904 Polidata, Census Population Estimates 
Turnout, Citizen Voting-Age 
Pop. 
0.6152 0.0940 Polidata, Census Population Estimates 
% religious adherents 0.5316 0.1828 Glenmary Research Center 
churches per 10,000 people 22.0993 13.0318 Glenmary Research Center 
% white 84.9912 15.8983 Census 2000 SF1 
% black 8.6330 14.3757 Census 2000 SF1 
% Hispanic 6.2098 12.0989 Census 2000 SF1 
median age of resident 38.4284 4.2668 Census Population Estimates 
% single-parent family 2000 0.2743 0.0763 Census 2000 SF1 
% in same house, 1995-2000 0.5905 0.0734 Census 2000 SF3 
% male pop. with bachelor’s 0.1089 0.0510 Census 2000 SF3 
% female pop. with bachelor’s 0.1093 0.0483 Census 2000 SF3 
% urban population 0.3940 0.3035 Census 2000 SF1 
ln (per capita income) 10.1514 0.2085 Bureau of Economic Analysis 
unemployment rate 5.6647 1.7966 Bureau of Labor Statistics 
real GDP growth ’03-’04 0.0354 0.0176 Bureau of Economic Analysis 
state unionization 0.0999 0.0520 Bureau of Labor Statistics 
% veterans 0.1397 0.0290 Census, Dept. of Veterans Affairs 
gay marriage dummy 0.2803 0.4492 CNN 2004 Election website 
county share of state electoral 
votes 
0.1725 0.5006 Federal Election Commission, Census 
Population Estimates 
age 18 and over pop. growth, 
2003-2004 
0.0102 0.0165 Census 2000 SF1, Census Population 
Estimates 
Cook closeness rating 0.8971 1.1741 CNN 2004 Election website 
Texas state dummy 0.0827 0.2754  
Massachusetts state dummy 0.0046 0.0675  
N = 3,061  
Table 2: Log-Marginal Likelihood Values and Posterior Model Probabilities 
Model Log-Marginal Likelihood Value Posterior Model Probability 
Normal Linear -102.84 
(2.2138e-5) 
≈0 
Spatially Lagged X -136.00 
(4.1693e-5) 
≈0 
Spatial Durbin 379.26 
(.1964) 
≈0 
Spatial Durbin Error 391.59 
(.0052) 
≈1 
Log-marginal likelihood values are calculated via the method of Chib and Jeliazkov (2001). Numbers in 
parentheses represent numerical standard errors for the log-marginal likelihood calculation. Calculations are based 
on 10,000 sampled values. 
  
Table 3: Direct Effects from the Spatial Durbin Error Model 
Direct Effect Mean Lower 95% Upper 95% 
adherents 0.0499 -0.0125 0.1121 
churches 0.0026 0.0016 0.0037 
white 0.0025 0.0009 0.004 
black 0.0016 -0.0001 0.0032 
Hispanic -0.0072 -0.0087 -0.0057 
median age 0.0139 0.0102 0.0176 
single-parent -0.1854 -0.4092 0.0367 
same house 1.4944 1.2868 1.6999 
male with ba 2.3636 1.886 2.834 
female with ba 1.5803 1.0921 2.0743 
urban -0.1833 -0.2285 -0.1384 
ln (per cap income) 0.1879 0.1193 0.2581 
unemploy rate 0.0027 -0.0039 0.0095 
rGDP growth 2.1355 0.95 3.3374 
unionization 0.2325 -0.3318 0.7996 
% veterans 0.5161 0.1153 0.9191 
gay marriage vote 0.0057 -0.0364 0.0476 
electoral vote share -0.0313 -0.0494 -0.0129 
population growth -0.036 -0.5795 0.5223 
Cook closeness 0.0509 0.0327 0.0686 
Texas dummy -0.0661 -0.1789 0.0491 
Mass. dummy 0.0179 -0.1388 0.1792 
 
   Parameter inferences are based on 10,000 sampled values with 10,000 sampled values 
used as burn-in. Lower 95% and Upper 95% represent the lower and upper 95% 
credible interval bounds, respectively. Entries in bold represent credible intervals 
that do not contain zero. 
    
  
Table 4: Indirect Effects from the Spatial Durbin Error Model 
Indirect Effect Mean Lower 95% Upper 95% 
adherents 0.1858 0.0436 0.3258 
churches -0.0021 -0.0048 0.0005 
white 0.0026 -0.0008 0.006 
black 0.0001 -0.0033 0.0034 
Hispanic 0.0036 0.001 0.0061 
median age -0.0096 -0.0185 -0.0007 
single-parent 0.4919 -0.0412 1.0429 
same house 0.1127 -0.3593 0.5831 
male with ba -0.3816 -1.6744 0.8866 
female with ba 2.3506 1.1397 3.5607 
urban -0.1725 -0.2931 -0.0523 
ln (per cap income) -0.079 -0.2533 0.0964 
unemploy rate 0.0131 -0.0021 0.0282 
rGDP growth -1.1671 -2.7782 0.4634 
unionization 0.676 -0.0489 1.4055 
% veterans 1.4349 0.4317 2.419 
gay marriage vote 0.0225 -0.0382 0.0831 
electoral vote share -0.046 -0.0963 0.006 
population growth 0.6666 -0.8289 2.1523 
Cook closeness 0.0002 -0.0243 0.0251 
Texas dummy 0.0034 -0.1409 0.144 
Mass. dummy -0.1214 -0.4155 0.1734 
 
   Parameter inferences are based on 10,000 sampled values with 10,000 sampled 
values used as burn-in. Lower 95% and Upper 95% represent the lower and upper 
95% credible interval bounds, respectively. Entries in bold represent credible 
intervals that do not contain zero. 
    
  
Table 5: Total Effects from the Spatial Durbin Error Model 
Total Effect Mean Lower 95% Upper 95% 
adherents 0.2357 0.0745 0.3928 
churches 0.0005 -0.0025 0.0036 
white 0.005 0.0012 0.0088 
black 0.0016 -0.0019 0.0052 
Hispanic -0.0036 -0.0062 -0.001 
median age 0.0043 -0.0059 0.0143 
single-parent 0.3065 -0.3225 0.9442 
same house 1.607 1.0701 2.1427 
male with ba 1.9819 0.438 3.5041 
female with ba 3.9308 2.4758 5.3673 
urban -0.3558 -0.4963 -0.2152 
ln (per cap income) 0.1088 -0.0938 0.3132 
unemploy rate 0.0158 -0.0012 0.0323 
rGDP growth 0.9684 -0.2803 2.2133 
unionization 0.9085 0.4038 1.4188 
% veterans 1.951 0.8046 3.097 
gay marriage vote 0.0282 -0.0204 0.0762 
electoral vote share -0.0773 -0.1349 -0.0173 
population growth 0.6306 -1.1291 2.443 
Cook closeness 0.0511 0.032 0.0703 
Texas dummy -0.0627 -0.1538 0.0267 
Mass. dummy -0.1035 -0.3825 0.1767 
 
   Parameter inferences are based on 10,000 sampled values with 10,000 sampled 
values used as burn-in. Lower 95% and Upper 95% represent the lower and upper 
95% credible interval bounds, respectively. Entries in bold represent credible 
intervals that do not contain zero. 
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